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ABSTRACT 
By 1965, behavioral social science had become a widely accepted approach to the scientific 
study of man and his politics. Any uncertainty as to what constituted a proper social science 
seemed to be raised most deeply by writers acquainted with the nature of physical science 
which most social science methodology seemed desparately to emulate. 
Recent comments by Nobel physicist Hideki Yukawa seem to indicate that little has 
changed in the physicist's scientific method in the last ten years and it would appear to be 
time to review those theories which prompted some radical reconsideration of the nature 
of both natural and social science over the last decade. 
The ideas which seem to lead to such a reconsideration include Werner Heisenberg's 
principle of uncertainty — that the observer's attempt to pin-point one phenomenon in 
nature disrupts or interferes with closely related phenomena; and Niels Bohr's principle 
of complimentarity where two seemingly different or contradictory theories when taken 
together offer a more complete understanding of a given phenomenon in the physical world. 
Michael Polanyi's notions of "tacit knowledge"and "indwelling" indicate that "we know 
more than we can tell" and that our view of isolated and detailed aspects of reality are 
rooted in a "prior knowledge"or even "involvement" in a larger whole. The capability of 
seeing or sharing in such larger wholes has been considered by humanistic psychologist 
Abraham Maslow as a measure of the scientist's maturity. A social scientist is open to more 
when he is a healthy person. 
Empathy, participation and man's purposefulness are the three human characteristics 
considered in this paper all of which seem to appear as the crux of a science of man by 
which all science must reinterpret its own methodology. To so interpret such characteristics 
rather than tailoring them to fit existing physical and behavioral scientific method and 
theory is to put certain ethical and political responsibilities of the social scientist at the 
very center of the nature, method and theory of our understanding of man and the science 
of man. 
The theories of Heisenberg, Bohr, Polanyi and Maslow support such a radical reinterpre-
tation and the conclusion of the paper is that such a reinterpretation does not so much 
redefine social science in the light of natural science, but puts a reconsideration of the 
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nature of man and science at center stage, so that a total regeneration of all science may 
be possible. 
The June 1974 newsletter of the Harvard Program on Public Conceptions of Science notes 
that "much of the public interest science literature appears to make the tacit assumption 
that expert scientists can and should continue to engage in traditional 'neutral' science and 
not be accountable to the larger society, even while assuming new, highly visible, and poli-
tically sensitive roles." Perhaps not too much has changed in our understanding of the 
nature of science in the last decade if the newsletter's analysis is correct. In spite of the 
seeming breakthrough in our reconsideration of what "real science" was all about, Hideki 
Yukawa, physicist and first Oriental to receive a Nobel prize, has very recently complained 
of the same shortcoming of science opened up by Werner Heisenberg ten to twenty years 
earlier. 
The "trend to abstraction", says Yukawa: 
has gone to extremes during the last twenty years. . . . Abstraction cannot work 
by itself, but has to be accompanied by intuition or imagination.. . . The power to 
predict is almost lost and theoretical physics has largely been reduced to a general 
and abstract way of describing what is already known empirically. . . . Another re-
juvenation of fundamental physics may be expected if greater regard is given to in-
tuition or bold imagination as a supplement to the inevitable trend to abstraction.1 
Perhaps it is time to review the thinking of those scientists who, like Yukawa, have been 
forced to stare in the face of their limitations, and to once again consider the implications 
that their rethinking of science have for the social scientist and his study of man. 
What these natural scientists, and philosophers of science like Michael Polanyi, have done 
for social science is to counter the attack of those who said that there were certain dimen-
sions involved in understanding man and his social environment which made the application 
of the scientific method (as known in the physical sciences) totally inappropriate or inade-
quate. The arguments to follow will examine a few such alleged stumbling blocks: empathy, 
participation and man's purposefulness. 
We might begin by reconsidering a typical defence of contemporary social science as 
many of us received it in graduate school over the past decade. What we faced was a num-
ber of social scientists and philosophers of science like Quentin Gibson (The Logic of Social 
Inquiry) who argued that man's purposeful behavior — his intentions and reasons — had 
been too long viewed as making any cause and effect analysis of social phenomena inappro-
priate. The reasons man behaves may be totally removed from the causes surrounding a 
particular event. It is, supposedly, the inability to abstract likenesses from human purpose-
fulness and make generalizations or universal laws or explanations of such likenesses which 
would make the scientific study of man impossible. A man like Quentin Gibson views ab-
straction as a process of distinguishing features: a selection of likenesses or differences. 
Features are not to be confused as parts or chunks of the whole. Features are, rather, the 
almost endless possible relationships and dimensions to human behavior and social activity. 
By stressing both like and unlike features we are able to say that investigation into indi-
vidual reasons (albeit very different ones at times) many be a form of abstraction not un-
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like that performed in other scientific endeavors. Reasons throw light on purposes and ends 
— they serve as explanations.2 
Similarly, it was argued that empathy need not be an extra-scientific dimension of under-
standing found in social studies but not in natural science. For empathy, according to Gibson, 
is simply a more efficient means of gathering evidence. The observer is simply in an advan-
tageous position to gather evidence, for example, in the midst of some primitive tribe observ-
ing "the daily round of inconspicuous activities."3 In short, by reducing empathy, purposeful 
behavior and involvement in social life to the predominant scientific world view of detached 
objectivity in physical life, the potential forces for a radical re-examination of the nature of 
all scientific inquiry could be snuffed out at birth. 
It is within the context of such ready dismissals of the revolutionary significance of em-
pathy and participation that the first of the important theories I wish to review is related. 
Werner Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy or uncertainty destroys any distinction that 
would proffer participation in social but not in physical or natural phenomena, but in such 
a way as to produce a new and wider interpretation of science. 
The principle of indeterminacy arose out of the discovery that it was impossible to mea-
sure both position and velocity of microphysical particles, and consequently the whole 
process of cause and effect determinacy broke down. Relatedly, neither position nor velo-
city of molecular particles could be observed without affecting one or the other. If a phy-
sicist wishes to observe position, he must be prepared to "control" velocity and vice versa. 
"Every process of observation produces a large disturbance," Heisenberg noted.4 And, in 
fact, pressing too hard for the understanding of one variable results in the loss of the other. 
Such findings eventually convinced Heisenberg that science ceased to speak for nature and 
"reality" itself but, rather, for man and his observation of reality. "Man increasingly con-
fronts himself alone," said Heisenberg. The "buildingstones of matter," once "held to be 
the last objective reality," are no longer considered "in themselves" since "they defy all 
forms of objective location in space and time." Physics no longer paints a picture of nature 
but rather "a picture of our relationships with nature."5 
Heisenberg's principle ends any clear distinction between participation in social science 
as against natural science. The ground of understanding is prepared so that empathy and 
participation can be seen to be the revolutionary dimension to all human learning. 
The second important principle closely related to indeterminacy was physicist Niels 
Bohr's principle of complementarity. By being used alternatively, perhaps in different situ-
ations and under different conditions, both wave and particle or quantum theories of light 
could be used to explain the same or related phenomena. The complementarity of two 
seemingly opposing theories of light employed alternatively has become a breakthrough in 
human understanding in physics. The principle can be applied as well to social science as, 
for example, to our understanding of the natural causes and human reasons involved in the 
same event, or to the social functions and human purposes in the same society or institution.6 
The third major source of new thinking which has been applied to the questions at hand 
is Michael Polanyi's view of the tacit dimension to human knowledge. Polanyi argues that 
"we know more than we can tell." We can "recognize" a friend's face and yet be unable to 
describe the separate features of that face. A comprehension of the whole, therefore, is 
different from a knowledge of the sum of its parts, just as three gallons of water and three 
of alcohol do not add up to six gallons of fluid.7 Had we never seen a frog, no sum of the 
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parts of one would offer an understanding of what a frog is. In fact, we recognize the parts 
of a frog, machine, perhaps even staff meetings, because of our prior knowledge of the whole 
complex of relationships. 
Similarly, the creative process of "seeing a problem" is to see something that is hidden: 
"to have an intimation of the coherence of hitherto uncomprehended particulars." The 
formulation of a problem, therefore, and the acceptance as true of discoveries contingent 
upon its formulation involves a commitment of ourselves "to a belief in all these as yet 
undisclosed, perhaps, as yet unthinkable, consequences."8 What is determined to be worthy 
of investigation by the scientist becomes a decision based on fundamental convictions about 
the nature of things. 
It is at this point that humanistic psychologist Abraham Maslow's stress on the psycho-
logical health of the scientist gains significance. In much of his last writing before his death 
in 1970 Maslow argued that many researchers have either deficiency or defensive needs 
while others are moved by growth or coping mechanisms. The search for knowledge, Maslow 
claimed, can be merely an anxiety-allaying procedure concerned with need-reduction.9 But 
once personal problems are being resolved, "we can get truly interested in the world for its 
own sake." In short, psychological health produces a better knower. 
A part of this psychological health is knowing one's self and honestly coming to grips 
with one's strengths and shortcomings. Such experiential knowledge which may contain ele-
ments of fearlessness, ego-transcendence, honesty, unselfishness and dedication precedes 
spectator knowledge and breeds one's effectiveness as an "instrument of knowledge." 
Empathy, therefore, rests upon the experiential knowledge and psychological health 
Maslow spoke about — an honest, objective gathering of empirical evidence where, as Gibson 
states, one does not substitute the taste of strawberries for the pain of the pinprick. But the 
kind of prior emphasis on experiential knowledge is not the emphasis that Quentin Gibson, 
Robert Brown (Explanation in Social Science) and so many social scientists and philosophers 
of science have stressed. So if we are to arrive at a better position from which to question 
the predominant views of social science, we ought to tie Maslow's comments to one further 
concept coming from Polanyi — that of "indwelling." 
Polanyi claims that tacit knowing implies an indwelling within the subject matter. One in 
a sense dwells in the whole of the matter being understood and so in some sense is embraced 
by the entire subject. We do not explain higher level developments in terms of lower. For 
example, the physics and chemistry of brickbuilding, the technique of bricklaying, the art 
of architecture and city planning cannot entertain the explanation of any higher level by a 
lower. But we do employ the lower level particulars within the context of our attention to 
higher level realities, problems, experiences, etc. "We know each level by interiorizing its 
particulars and mentally performing the integration which constitutes it."10 
Instead of observing [particulars] in themselves, we may be aware of them in their 
bearing on the comprehensive entity which they constitute. It brings home to use 
that it is not by looking at things, but by dwelling in them, that we understand their 
joint meaning.11 
Indwelling, therefore, is something more than empathy; it underlies all observation. As a 
part of all observation "from the minimum of indwelling, exercised in a physical observation, 
we move without a break to the maximum of indwelling which is a total commitment."12 
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It is interesting to consider the effect of undue attention given to particulars — for example, 
the paralysis which might set in if a concert pianist were to focus attention on the movement 
of his fingers. Polanyi admits that if attention to particulars is later interiorized it may in-
crease knowledge, but he deems it more likely that "meticulous detailing may obscure be-
yond recall a subject like history, literature or philosophy." 
Polanyi points to what he believes to be a fundamental fallacy — the "belief that, since 
particulars are more tangible, their knowledge offers a true conception of things." 
The declared aim of modern science is to establish a strictly detached, objective know-
ledge. Any falling short of this ideal is accepted only as a temporary imperfection, 
which we must aim at eliminating. But suppose that tacit thought forms an indispen-
sable part of all knowledge, then the ideal of eliminating all personal elements of 
knowledge would, in effect, aim at the destruction of all knowledge. The ideal of 
exact science would turn out to be fundamentally misleading and possibly a source 
of devastating fallacies.13 
Rather than attempting to argue that empathy, sympathy, participation or involvement, 
purposeful behavior and imagination are really not all that different from the usual forms 
of scientific evidence-gathering in the physical realm, the concepts of tacit knowing and 
indwelling attempt to incorporate all of the above within themselves and make such means 
of gaining knowledge essential to all realms of science, social and natural. In other words, 
instead of trying to argue that there is really no difference between natural and social science 
and no stumbling blocks to the applications of the former to the latter, we should see in the 
creative ways of understanding man and his social millieu some indication of how all of reali-
ty is understood: ways which have previously gone without proper recognition. When Gibson, 
Brown, and others argue that empathy, for example, is essentially a classical form of evidence-
gathering, save for a better position, the result of such an argument is that we have an all too 
simple view of the whole dimension of human understanding. Scientific abstraction is to be 
understood, therefore, not just as a selection of features from the whole but as abstraction 
based on prior experience of the whole. 
Empathy makes a difference not just because of an advantageous position for gathering 
evidence but because of a "caring" relationship — a qualitative or moral difference. In the 
way that Maslow talked about the mature and healthy knower (arising out of empathy and 
participation or involvement) we have what he called a "helpful" dimension to understand-
ing. We are, most of us, aware of drug addicts or problem drinkers who say of certain persons 
that they "really know" the problem and only they can "really help." Most of those who 
"really know" have shared the problem and care for those who now face it. Maslow went on 
to argue that perhaps all knowledge is related to such a caring relationship if only to the 
extent that we can speak of a "love for" or "interest in" subjects and problems even by 
astronomers or chemists.14 
The dimension of understanding to which we refer is also characterized by trust. Margaret 
Mead has said of her own field: "Anthropological research does not have subjects. We work 
with informants in an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect."15 
The observer in Quentin Gibson's tribal society who observes the inconspicuous activities 
of the daily round, therefore, does so in large measure because he trusts and is trusted, he 
exhibits concern and sees the meanings and importance (a tacit dimension) and behaves 
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ethically, consequently perceiving and understanding relationships that cannot otherwise be 
comprehended. 
One short comment on detachment may also be in order. Heisenberg, we should recall, 
claimed that men see that reality which results out of their decisions as to what it is they 
wish to observe. Or we are constantly grasping and shaping reality, as theologian Paul Tillich 
preferred to say. In fact, "we transform reality according to the way we see it, and we see 
reality according to the way we transform it," Tillich said.16 
Our interest and emotion, therefore, become vehicles for perceiving knowledge. "Reason 
is like a light which by its own inner force can move nowhere. It must be carried in order 
to move."17 Interest and emotion become such carriers. The content (reason) is not, there-
fore, necessarily emotional; but nothing is moved, transmitted and received cognitively with-
out emotion. Detachment, therefore, is a condition of a prior cognitive union. It is informa-
tive to note that Asiatics take the unifying, healing, transforming powers of knowledge as 
a matter of course. "Their problem — never completely solved — is the element of distance, 
not that of union," Tillich observed. He explained further by adding that there are "levels 
in man's bodily, psychic and mental constitution which can and must be grasped by [detach-
ment] . But this is neither the way of knowing human nature nor is it the way of knowing 
any individual personality in past or present, including one's self."18 
This is not to say that some alternative method of understanding man is posited by Tillich, 
but rather, that our scientific study of man can involve considerably more than detached 
value-free analysis, and must involve more, if we are to properly understand ourselves and our 
social and political lives. 
To re-evaluate the place and importance of detachment and objectification in the manner 
begun above ought to raise for us the question of verification and the validation of our under-
standings. As long as we remember that verification is rooted in experiential knowledge, there 
is probably not too great a problem here. Maslow offered us the case of the man who talked 
of having viewed an "unheard o f ' animal in the midst of a desert. Verification demands the 
right of other people to see that animal for themselves; hence, as Maslow pointed out, such 
a right is what verification is all about: i.e. an extension of "see for yourself."19 The valida-
tion of many experiences (say, of "knowing" a political leader's meanings, reasons, intentions 
and values) may come to fruition only in "the life-process i tself ' ; that is, over time "it fits."20 
Verification may also take the form of the illumination of, let us say, political figures in past 
or present. 
It is of the utmost importance to bear in mind that all processes of verification measure 
findings against "established truths" and that established truths and, in fact, all existing know-
ledge and means of proof, must be subject to yet larger truths. Otherwise, the profound skep-
ticism which denies this view would destroy the very love of truth upon which the scientific 
community is built. Polanyi argued this point by stating: 
The method of disbelieving every proposition which cannot be verified by definitely 
prescribed operations would destroy all natural science and it would destroy, in fact, 
belief in truth and in the love of truth itself which is the condition of free thought. 
The method leads to complete metaphysical nihilism and thus denies the basis for any 
universally significant manifestation of the human mind.21 
Consequently, profound and critical reflection on what we know to be science or scienti-
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fic procedure; on what one does, or how one thinks and functions, as a scientist; ought to 
be a constant endeavor. Such knowledge ought always to be reappraising its roots and en-
larging its understanding of itself — a philosophical task of great significance. This reappraisal 
is precisely what Heisenberg, Bohr, Polanyi, and Maslow have set out to do. Their success as 
scientists combined with the revolutionary vitality to their thought about science ought to 
have been cause for careful soul-searching on the part of the rest of us, whatever our scientific 
discipline. 
As we conclude, then, we are left with questions of direction and moral or ethical respon-
sibility. The responsibilities which face us are (1) the philosophical task of reflecting on 
science and the nature of research and (2) the decisions that each of us must make as to 
what we want to know, why we want to know it and how we are to come to know it. Deci-
sions on the "what," "why," "how" questions will determine the direction scientific en-
deavors take. Once again, then, we become responsible for those directions. 
Perhaps the point which is more closely related to what I have attempted to review here, 
however, is that the principles of uncertainty and complementarity plus the notion of tacit 
knowledge remind us at every stage that we scientists (social or physical) are actors; that we 
cannot avoid our "indwelling" relationship to the world of nature, man, or politics we seek 
to understand. And we will by how we answer those questions of direction; we will by what 
we choose to study, and how and why we choose to study it — we will reshape our society 
and politics; we will refashion our world — for better or worse. 
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